Federalist No. 27

In this essay, Hamilton continues his arguments for an empowered federal government, positing that a highly engaged and active government (within the bounds of its enumerated powers), would be more likely to keep the peace and not have to resort to exercising its power in order to enforce order.

Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (continued)

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims.

There have been numerous claims to the effect that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot  operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws.  Like most of the assertions of those opposed to ratification, this claim is unsupported by any clear explanation of the reasoning behind it.  As far as I can tell, they seem to be saying that the people won’t stand for the exercise of federal authority in domestic matters.  Leaving aside the difficulties with discerning the difference between external and internal policy, let’s look at the grounds for supposing that the people would not be willing to be subject to federal governance.  The only way this logic works, is if we also assume that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the State government.  Otherwise, the argument simply doesn’t hold for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people.  As a general rule, the people’s confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.  Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, but they arise out of circumstances unrelated to the intrinsic merits or flaws of a constitution.  Such exceptions have to be considered based on general principles and maxims.

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.

In the course of these papers, I have demonstrated various reasons why it’s probable that a federal government will be better administered than the State governments.  The chief reason is that by extending the election of government over a wider population, there will be more choice to the people.  They will be able to select, through their respective legislatures, eminently qualified men to serve in the Senate.  There is reason therefore, to expect that this body will be chosen with such care and judgement as to make it less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction.  These men will possess greater knowledge and more information in the national councils, and remain above the fray of those occasional ill-humors, temporary prejudices, which in smaller societies frequently contaminate the public councils.  Such petty partisanship and corruption lead to injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and give birth to self-interested schemes and end in  dissatisfaction and disgust.  When we look with a critical eye at the structure of the edifice we are erecting in our new government, there are other strong reasons to believe that the federal government will be administered better than those of the States.  It is sufficient to say that until evidence is provided to the contrary, there is no reason to believe that the laws of the Union will be met with greater obstruction than those of the States are, and that they would need other methods of enforcement than those employed by the States.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former sentiment and to inspire the latter, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member.

The expectation of laws not being enforced is a strong incitement to sedition; the fear of consequence is an equally strong deterrent to it.   Isn’t it logical that the Union, with all the resources at its command, collectively, will be able to repress sedition and inspire obedience, better than a single State, which only has it’s own limited resources at its disposal.  An uprising within a State may think itself capable of dealing with the State government, but would hardly be so foolish as to imagine itself able to contend with the combined efforts of the Union.  If this is true, then, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member.

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channls and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.

At this point, I will hazard an observation which is not less accurate because of its novelty.  The more the general operations of a national government are exercised, the more the citizens get used to it as commonplace.  The more they get used to it, and the more entrenched it becomes in their everyday lives, the greater the likelihood that it will gain the respect and appreciation of the community.  Man is very much a creature of habit.  That which is out of sight, is out of mind.  A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people.  It follows then, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern.  The government will consequently have less reason to resort to force in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its reach.  The more pervasive the government is in the everyday lives of its citizens, the less it will require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.

It should be obvious that a government like the one proposed would be a whole lot more likely to avoid the necessity of using force, than the kind of confederacy advocated by most of its opponents.  This sort of league would only be able to exercise authority upon the States in their political or collective capacities, rather than on the citizens.  It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force.  The frequent delinquencies of the members are part and parcel of such a form of government.  When these things happen, the only remedy, if a remedy is to be had, is through war and violence.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.1 Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct?

Because the plan that came out of the convention extends the authority of the federal government over the individual citizens of the several States, it will enable the government to exert each State’s authority in the execution of its laws.  It’s easy to see that this will greatly blur the distinction of laws with regard to their source.  Consequently, this will allow the federal government the same advantages for securing obedience to its authority as the States enjoy.  The federal government will also be able to influence public opinion greatly because it will be able to draw for support upon the resources of the whole Union.   It bears noting at this point, that the laws of the Union, within the expressly delineated limits of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land.  All officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound to it by oath.   And so, the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the States, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its legitimate enumerated limits of authority extend, and will act as auxiliaries to the enforcement of its laws.¹  Anyone who follows this to its logical conclusions will understand the consequences of this situation, and will see that there is ample reason to expect a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.  If we arbitrarily suppose the contrary, all bets are off, its easy to manufacture any conclusion we want.  For, it is certainly possible that even the best government which injudiciously exercises authority, may provoke the people into the wildest excesses.  And so, if the adversaries of the proposed Constitution assume that the national rulers will be selfish and shirk their duty, I would ask them how such self-interest, ambition, or the encroachment of liberty can be effectively promoted by such conduct?

PUBLIUS

¹. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its proper place, be fully detected.